Current strategies for the sanitation sector by Borsoi, Zilda Maria Ferrão et al.
INFRASTRUCTURE BRIEFING 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT DIVISION                       MAR/98                N° 20 
 
Current Strategies for the Sanitation Sector 
 
This briefing discusses the main issues regarding the sanitation sector within Brazil, five 
different approaches adopted by state governments, as well as private participation in 
autonomous operations managed by local authorities. It ends with a number of 
considerations regarding the postponement of investments. 
 
THE SECTOR AT NATIONAL LEVEL 
 
Privatization represents one way of securing essential investments for the sector, as well 
as of increasing service efficiency. 
 
Contracts: Brazil has over 5,000 local authorities, of which some 3,700 awarded 
sanitation service concessions to state companies in the 1970s. A large number of these 
concessions have already expired, or are due to expire in the near future. In a number of 
other local authorities, such state companies operate sanitation services without ever 
having signed a formal contract of concession. The capital cities of most states fall into 
this latter group, as do a series of other local authorities that were created through the 
subdivision of larger local authorities in which state companies were already present. 
 
Capacity for leverage: The financial condition of public-sector companies, whether 
controlled by state governments, local authorities, or autonomous bodies, has been 
deteriorating for several years, reducing their ability to raise capital for financing 
investments. Despite the urgent need for investment within the sector, loans from the 
Unemployment Benefit Fund (FGTS) have fallen from R$ 773 million in 1996 to R$ 356 
million in 1997, reflecting the poor capital raising ability of the public sector. 
 
Investment needs: According to a study carried out for the Modernization Program for 
the Sanitation Sector, financed by the World Bank and directed by SEPURB/MPO, 
investments of R$ 42 billion will be required over the next 15 years, concentrated mainly 
in sewage, in order to provide a global water and sewage service (including sewage 
treatment). Over the period 1970-96, loans from the Unemployment Benefit Fund 
(FGTS) amounted to R$ 15 billion. This figure represents almost all of the investment in 
the sector, most of which was invested in companies controlled by state governments. 
 
Provision of services: In general terms, the quality of services provided by public sector 
operators leaves a good deal to be desired. Losses in water supply amount to the high 
figure of 45% of total water produced, and there are other more specific problems 
regarding continuity and quality of supply. Sewage services are even more problematic. 
In addition to these problems, it is not clear whether the right to operate service 
concessions in certain metropolitan and other urban regions and micro-regions belongs to 
state governments, or to local authorities that are in turn subject to state restrictions on 
the integration of such services. 
 
It is important to note the National Privatization Committee’s (CND) decision to 
authorize the BNDES to commission models for the privatization of the sanitation sector. 
This shows the federal government’s understanding of privatization as a means of 
providing the necessary funding for the sector, as has been the case for other publicly 
owned sectors that have exhausted their funding capabilities.  
 
At the same time, the resolution of matters in dispute, whether this is a question of 
changes in legislation, settling of disputes by the judiciary or intervention by the 
executive to promote negotiated solutions, is of fundamental importance for the 
privatization of the sanitation sector. 
 
POSITIONS ADOPTED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS – CASE STUDIES 
 
5 cases have been chosen to illustrate how many different approaches have been adopted 
within the sector, showing the degree to which the current institutional situation is 
lacking in definition. By way of information, each case includes a number of parameters 
for the relevant state company. 
 
Rio de Janeiro – State Government decides to privatize 
 
Total number of local authorities within the state  81 
Local authorities serviced by CEDAE 64 
Provision of water supply index (1) 78% 
Sewage collection index (1) 44% 
Sewage treated (2) as a % of sewage produced 13% 
Revenue loss index (1)  50% 
    Source: (1) SEPURB, (2) Consultant 
    *Half of all treated sewage results from the underwater outlet in Ipanema 
 
In 1995, Rio de Janeiro became the first state to create a privatization program (PED) for 26 
companies, including the sanitation company, CEDAE. With a view to privatizing the sanitation 
sector, and using funding from the PMSS, the state government hired consultants to value the 
sector, to restructure CEDAE, and to model its sale, at the same time looking into partial 
alternatives. In parallel to this, the state assembly took the pioneering step of passing legislation 
(State Law No. 2,686, approved on February 13, 1997) to create a regulatory authority for 
public services within the state, ASEP-RJ, whose brief will extend beyond the sanitation sector. 
 
Despite the political resolve of the state government, the transfer of sanitation services to the 
private sector did not take place either within the timeframe or in the manner predicted, due to a 
number of complicating events and setbacks: 
 
-In the second half of 1996, the state government decided to put out to tender the water/sewage 
concession for Barra da Tijuca, Recreio and Jacarepaguá, covering 600,000 residents, with 
programmed investments of US$ 200 million. The tendering process was halted after several 
modifications to the tender document (e.g. the exclusion of Recreio from the concession area, 
revision of the tariff structure), following which, the state decided on the full-scale privatization 
of CEDAE, including all of its concession area; 
 
-The local authority of Campos declared that CEDAE’s concession there had expired (the local 
community had launched a legal action against the local authority for its failure to provide an 
adequate service), and held its own tender to offer the concession to the private sector, which 
was won by a consortium that included the company, Águas do Paraíba. CEDAE launched its 
own counteraction to prevent the new concessionaire from assuming the concession, and 
succeeded in overturning the tender; 
 
-In the Lagos region, the state government was successful in its negotiations with the local 
authorities of Cabo Frio, Búzios, Arraial do Cabo, S. Pedro da Aldeia and Iguaba (the 
concessionaire Prolagos), as well as with the local authorities of Saquarema, Araruama and 
Silva Jardim (the concessionaire Águas de Juturnaíba), securing the relevant concessions. The 
state government signed a letter of agreement with these local authorities, whereby it received 
authorization to proceed with the preparation for the sale of sanitation service concessions for 
their areas of jurisdiction, culminating in the launch of a joint tender. 
 
-On December 16, 1997, the state assembly approved Complementary State Law No. 87, which 
created the Metropolitan Region of Rio de Janeiro as well as the micro-region of Lagos, and 
defined services of public interest in these areas, including basic sanitation, which encompasses 
water production and distribution, as well as the collection and treatment of sewage. The state 
government will assume responsibility for such services; 
 
-Shortly afterwards, in January 1998, the Democratic Workers’ Party (PDT) presented an 
appeal to the Supreme Federal Court (STF) to suspend Complementary State Law No. 87, and 
Ordinary Law No. 2,869, which regulates the same state law, on the grounds that both were 
unconstitutional. The appeal highlighted the ‘state government’s attempt to usurp powers and 
authorities that infringe the constitutional autonomy of municipalities’; 
 
-On February 3, 1998, the public hearing on the structuring of the privatization of CEDAE 
finally took place. The tender document proposed the sale in a single lot of 89.9% of the 
company’s share capital to a new owner, with 10% of its share capital to be offered to the 
company’s employees at a 30% discount to the determined sale price. The state government 
currently holds 99.9% of the company’s share capital. 
 
-On February 17, 1998, the Local Authority of Rio de Janeiro published an advertisement, 
stating that it would take judicial action against the sale of CEDAE unless it was included in the 
privatization process. The local authority claimed that Complementary State Law No. 87, which 
transferred sanitation service concessions to the state government, was unconstitutional; 
 
-On February 19, 1998, the Local Authority of Niterói also published an advertisement 
regarding the privatization of CEDAE, pointing out both that the company did not own the 
relevant operating assets within its concession area, and that the local authority’s sanitation 
company, EMUSA, had already held a tender for the local authority’s sanitation service 
concession that had been awarded to the consortium, Águas de Niterói. The local authority has 
already notified CEDAE that it must relinquish the concession immediately (its contract with 
the company has already expired). 
 
At the time of going to press, the definitive prospectus for the privatization of CEDAE still 
awaits publication. The example of the state of Rio de Janeiro shows that, despite the state 
government’s determination to privatize, the general situation remains undefined, and that the 
privatization process itself faces certain risks.  
 
São Paulo – State government to retain control 
 
Total number of local authorities within the state 625 
Local authorities serviced by SABESP (1) 358 
Provision of water supply index (1) 99% 
Sewage collection index (1) 73% 
Sewage treated (2) as a % of sewage produced 19% 
Revenue loss index (2)  36% 
Source: (1) Annual report -1997, (2) SEPURB 
 
The São Paulo Sanitation Company, SABESP, provides services to 24 million customers, or 
70% of the population of the state of São Paulo, and is the largest sanitation company in Latin 
America by revenues. The company also has significant investment requirements, which 
reached R$ 2 billion over the period 1995-97, with a further R$ 1.1 billion budgeted for 1998, 
most notably in the São Paulo Metropolitan Area. Under the control of the current state 
government, a number of steps have been taken: 
 
-Starting in 1995, the company underwent a significant restructuring, with its operations 
reorganized into 16 business units under the control of four vice-presidencies: Metropolitan 
Area Production, Metropolitan Area Distribution, Upstate (Interior) and Coastal (Litoral). At 
the same time, SABESP restructured its tariff system, raising its water and sewage rates, and 
reduced headcount. In 1994-95, these and other measures resulted in a 23% rise in gross 
revenues, a 22% reduction in operating costs, as well as a reduction of 45% in expenses with 
third-party services and a 20% reduction in employee numbers; 
 
-The State Government hired consultants, with the aid of the PMSS, to study a prospective 
regulatory system for sanitation services within the state. This work is nearing completion, and 
is likely to recommend the creation of a regulatory body at state level that will be autonomous, 
exclusively devoted to the sanitation sector, and associated with the Water Resources 
Department; 
 
-SABESP has presented proposals to a number of local authorities, with a view to expanding its 
concession area. In 1997, it won concessions in 28 new local authority areas, of which 12 
resulted from the expiration of previous concessions. This expansion by SABESP into new 
areas without an open bidding process has been contested (a legal opinion issued by the 
Brazilian Association of Public Water and Sewage Concessionaires – ABCON, maintains that 
such a bidding process can only be waived in cases where the issuer of the concession and the 
concessionaire are controlled by the same branch of government). Against this, it is worth 
noting the decision by the Municipal Chamber of Santos, which at the end of 1997, decided to 
remain independent from SABESP (in a similar manner to Diadema, in June 1993, and Mauá, 
in September 1994); 
 
-SABESP is currently preparing the sale of a strategic stake, equivalent to 20% of its share 
capital. At present, the company’s traded free float amounts to only 8.3% of its total share 
capital. Following the sale of this stake, the company will remain under public control, albeit 
under the supervision of a private partner that will sign a management contract as well as an 
agreement with shareholders. 
 
The case of São Paulo thus demonstrates that state government policy is directed towards 
maintaining control over sanitation services. At the same time, the state authorities are trying to 
improve the efficiency of their services through partnerships with the private sector. It is worth 
noting that other companies in the South of Brazil are in the process of seeking a stock market 
listing with a view to selling their shares, even if it is too early to conclude that São Paulo will 
take the same approach. 
 
Espírito Santo – Intention to sell 
 
Total number of local authorities within the state 71 
Local authorities serviced by CESAN* 52 
Provision of water supply index 95% 
Sewage collection index 12% 
Sewage treated as a % of sewage produced 8% 
Revenue loss index 28% 
Sources: SEPURB 
* CESAN/ Govt. ES 
 
The formal commitment by the state government of Espírito Santo to sell its shares in CESAN 
dates from the end of 1996. In December 1996, the government agreed a pioneering 
experimental operation with the BNDES, that included an advance on the proceeds from the 
sale, and that was intended as a pilot study for the privatization of the sector. The privatization 
process has developed as follows: 
 
-In mid-1997, discussions were in progress with the five local authorities within the Vitória 
Metropolitan Area, under the terms of the proposed model. The state government recognized 
the local authorities' right to participate in the management of water distribution, as well as 
collection and treatment of sewage, while CESAN would remain responsible for water 
production. The local authorities and the state government intended to draw up agreements that 
established rules for the awarding of concessions by the local authorities to the private sector, as 
well as the prices that the new concessionaires would have to pay for these, in order to allow 
local authorities to indemnify CESAN for the undepreciated balance of its investments. Four 
concessions would be put out to tender (Vitória, Vila Velha, Serra, and the double Cariacica-
Viana concession), with the state government and local authorities making a joint selection of 
concessionaires. Under the proposed scheme, CESAN would retain the concession for the 
interior of the state; 
 
-By adopting a joint management approach, the state government hoped to obtain the necessary 
funding for its Coastal Ecosystem Environmental Recuperation Program for the State of 
Espírito Santo, which is being financed in part by the World Bank. 
 
-At the start of 1998, the proposed model is being re-examined, in order to determine whether 
the state government should sell control of CESAN together with all its local authority 
concessions. Such a move would entail an advisory role for the BNDES. The state government 
and the local authorities also intend to define a new legal and regulatory framework for the 
sector, using PMSS resources, and plan, in particular, to create a specific regulatory body. 
 
Mato Grosso do Sul - Privatization with local authority participation 
 
Total number of local authorities within the state 77 
Local authorities serviced by SANESUL 75 
Provision of water supply index  94% 
Sewage collection index  10% 
Sewage treated as a % of sewage produced 1.5% 
Revenue loss index   34% 
      Sources: IBGE - SEPURB - SANESUL  
 
A number of factors led SANESUL to rethink its operational strategy, starting in 1995: 
 
-Following the approval of the Law of Concessions (Law No. 8,987) on February 13, 1995, a 
number of problems arose with regard to the validity of concessions. The local authority of 
Dourados, for example, ruled that its contract with SANESUL, that had already been approved 
by the Municipal Chamber, was null and void, since it had not been accompanied by a tender 
process; 
 
-In August 1995, the company's contract with Campo Grande expired; 
 
-At the end of the same year, as part of a debt renegotiation agreement with the Treasury, as 
well as the agreement of a bridging loan with the Caixa Econômica Federal, the state 
government of Mato Grosso do Sul agreed to privatize both the state electrical company, 
ENERSUL, and the state sanitation company, SANESUL, by the end of 1997, under the terms 
of the State Privatization Program (PED), that was introduced on May 23, 1996. 
 
As a result, SANESUL adopted the following measures: 
 
-The company carried out a wide-ranging restructuring program, that included a reduction in 
employee numbers, staff training and an improvement in performance indicators through the 
introduction of information technology and loss control systems; 
 
-The company commissioned a study (in mid-1996), to devise a model for its privatization, 
adopting as a basic premise the fact that the relevant local authority would be responsible for 
granting concessions; 
 
-The company made presentations of its proposals and held discussions with the principal 
parties involved in the process, most notably the state government and relevant local authorities 
(1997). 
 
The model proposed that concessions be negotiated by local authorities on a case-by-case basis, 
with the participation of SANESUL, and aimed to devolve control of services to individual 
local authorities, grouping neighboring municipalities together, with a view to increasing the 
attractiveness of concessions to the private sector. A number of mayors who were consulted 
nevertheless objected to this form of negotiation, expressing fears that they would be obliged to 
assume responsibility for services if negotiations proved unsuccessful. The state government 
also expressed concerns that smaller local authority concessions would prove less attractive to 
the private sector, and that it would remain responsible for these. The current situation is as 
follows: 
 
-A new alternative is under study: tenders will involve concession areas that are more attractive 
to private investors, that include a larger number of municipalities, and will include provisions 
aimed at maintaining quality of service; 
 
-The company is examining the relevant legal considerations, and is likely to commission a new 
study to determine the best way of carrying out the intended privatization. 
 
Mato Grosso - Opting for control by local authorities 
 
Total number of local authorities within the state 126 
Local authorities serviced by SANEMAT 93 
Provision of water supply index  92% 
Sewage collection index  14% 
Sewage treated as a % of sewage produced 3.6% 
Revenue loss index   48% 
                                    Sources: IBGE - SEPURB - SANEMAT  
 
The process of devolving control of sanitation services to local authorities is being carried out 
without the active participation of SANEMAT, by the 'Department of Modernization', which is 
implementing a wider-ranging modernization program within the state. At the same time, 
SANEMAT is serving as the project's source of information, or 'database'. 
 
-The State Government, with the support of the PMSS, has signed a series of agreements with 
local authorities to cover a transition period with a proposed length of 90 days, which may be 
extended for a further 90 days. These agreements fall into three categories: 
 
1. Technical Co-operation Agreements  - these are the simplest kind of agreement, and are 
being used for local authorities that have not yet decided how they will manage their 
sanitation systems in the future, as well as for very small local authorities (with less than 
1,000 clients). Through this agreement, local authorities gain access to information on the 
financial and operational condition of their systems. Some 38 local authorities have signed 
this kind of agreement. 
 
2. Mutual Co-operation Agreement  - this kind of agreement has been signed with local 
authorities that have already decided to transfer concessions to the private sector. In addition 
to access to information on its systems, the local authority receives model tender documents, 
together with all the documentation necessary to grant legal approval, from a consultant 
hired by the state government. Five local authorities have already signed this kind of 
agreement: Cuiabá, Cáceres, Nobres, Alta Floresta and Jauru. 
 
3. Shared Management Agreement  - such agreements have been signed with three local 
authorities whose concession contracts with SANEMAT had already expired: Jaciara, 
Várzea Grande and Rondonópolis. Under this kind of agreement, the local authority 
participates in the management of the concession, even if operational control of the system 
remains the responsibility of SANEMAT. 
 
-There are plans to create a regulatory agency within the state that would establish rules and act 
as arbiter in disputes, as well as a State Sanitation Commission, and a number of regional 
councils. Under the terms of the proposed system, tariffs would be defined at local authority 
level. 
 
--The proposal for the creation of the agency has already been submitted to the office of the 
Attorney General of the state, where it is currently being examined. At a future date, it will be 
presented to the state assembly. 
 
-The intention with regard to the proposed State Sanitation Commission is that it should 
collaborate with the regional councils to establish priorities for sanitation on a periodic and 
region-by-region basis. 
 
CURRENT STATUS OF AUTONOMOUS LOCAL AUTHORITIES 
 
This is the part of the sector where private investors have found the most favorable institutional 
conditions. To date, 23 concessions have been formally transferred, two of which relate to 
consortia of local authorities in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Details are given in the following 
table: 









NATURE OF CONCESSION 
 
Araçatuba – SP 157,467 SANEAR (Amafi, Multiservice, Resil, 
Tejofran) 
Sewage 
Birigüi – SP 84,016 AQUAPÉROLA (Isratec/ Hidrogesp) BOT deep well 
Cajamar – SP 33,707 ÁGUAS DE CAJAMAR Ltda. 
(Multiservice, Rek) 
Water 
Campos – RJ 350,000 ÁGUAS DO PARAÍBA (Developer, 
Cowan,  Queiroz Galvão, Carioca) 
Full (water + sewage) 
Itu – SP 112,939 CAVO ITU (Cavo, Camargo Corrêa) Sewage 
Jaú – SP 97,354 ÁGUAS DE MANGADA (Amafi, 
Multiservice, empr. Portugal) 
Water 
Jaú – SP  Consórcio C.R. Almeida, SILEC 
(Itália) 
Sewage 
Jundiaí - SP 288,644 CIA. SANEAMENTO DE JUNDIAÍ  
(Augusto Velloso, Coveg, Tejofran) 
Sewage 
Limeira-SP 217,489 ÁGUAS DE LIMEIRA (Lyonnaise des 
Eaux, CBPO) 
Full 
Mairinque - SP 35,000 CIÁGUA (Grupo Villanova) Full 
Marília - SP 173,841 ÁGUAS DE MARÍLIA (Hidrogesp) Water (BOT well, conduit, 
reservoir) 
Mineiros do Tietê - SP 9,462 SANECISTE Full 
Niterói - RJ 448,736 ÁGUAS DE NITERÓI (Cowan, 
Carioca, Trana, Q. Galvão, Developer) 
Full 
Ourinhos - SP 79,148 ÁGUAS DE ESMERALDA 
(Hidrogesp, Multiservice) 
Water - deep tubular well 
Ourinhos-SP  TELAR (Telar Eng.) Sewage 
Paranaguá - PR 110,000 ÁGUAS DE PARANAGUÁ 
(Castilho, Carioca, Developer) 
Full 
Pereiras - SP 4,850 NOVACON Full 
Petrópolis - RJ 263,838 ÁGUAS DO IMPERADOR (Cowan, 
Trana, Q. Galvão, Developer) 
Full 
Lagos region -I RJ 
(Araruama/Saquarema/Silv
a Jardim) 
200,000 ÁGUAS DE JUTURNAÍBA (Cowan, 
Trana, Q. Galvão, Developer, ERCO) 
Full 
Lagos region-II RJ  (C. 
Frio/ Búzios/ Arraial/ S.P. 
Aldeia) 
 PROLAGOS (Monteiro Aranha/Águas 
de Portugal/ PEN) 
Full 
Ribeirão Preto - SP 450,960 AMBIENT (CH2MHill/Rek) Sewage 
Salto – SP 100,000 SANECISTE DE SALTO (Saneciste) Sewage treatment 
Tuiuti – SP 3,000 RIBEIRÃO DO PÂNTANO - Emp. 
Saneamento Tuiuti (Novacon) 
Full 
     Source: ABCON; BNDES      
 
The state of São Paulo has the largest number of private concessions (covering 16 local 
authorities), and has a total of 270 autonomous municipalities, of which 103 have over 50,000 
inhabitants, that in theory could offer attractive concessions to private operators. 
 
Having said this, the rate of entry of private investors into the sanitation sector has not reflected 
that sector's own claims of investment opportunities with attractive returns. This implies that: 
 
-On the one hand, local authorities have been slow to implement privatization programs, 
suggesting that they also have certain concerns regarding the process, most notably as a result 
of the poor quality of available information on which they must base decisions. To make 
matters worse, in many cases where concessions had already been transferred to the private 
sector, a general lack of clarity regarding the inspection and regulation of concessions became a 
source of uncertainty. There were also a number of instances where tariff adjustments were 
rejected due to local political considerations; 
 
-On the other hand, the private sector has lacked the necessary guarantees. While the 
institutional situation of autonomous municipalities is clearer than that of other municipalities, 
concerns remain regarding a number of divergent legal positions for those municipalities 
located in metropolitan areas, urban regions and micro-regions, that derive from draft laws 
currently being examined by congress (draft laws of Senator Serra and Federal Deputy Lima 
Neto). 
 
Lending programs by the BNDES and the Caixa Econômica Federal to finance expenditure by 
local authorities, as well as the hiring of consultants to identify problems, devise models, carry 
out feasibility studies, and design the new regulatory agency, PROPAR, are measures that are 
intended to reassure public sector authorities in the process of taking decisions on privatization, 




Delays in the definition of legal directives will result in delays in investment, even if there is 
scope for limited initiatives, such as the sale of equity stakes by sanitation companies. The price 
of these shares will nevertheless be affected by the current legal/institutional situation, while the 
growth of funding to the sector will depend on whether state governments reinvest the proceeds 
from the sale of their shares in sanitation companies in those companies. In so far as the same 
companies remain under the control of state governments, they will continue to have only 
limited access to funding, and will remain subject to public sector rules. 
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